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Sustainability and fairness still missing  




Abstract: Despite deep cuts in pensions implemented by the recent Law 4378/2016, the 
Social Insurance System in Greece is still characterized by a multitude of problems - financial, 
social and organizational. These make it counterproductive in improving intra-generational 
inequality and inter-generational fairness, while its bureaucratic complexity makes the 
planning and implementation of reforms a difficult task. The aim of the paper is first to describe 
the long-term adverse dynamics and, second, to suggest a road map of changes that ensure a 
fairer treatment among the various categories of pensioners as well as between them and current 
generation employees. Such a policy should at the same time cut privileged pensions and 
increase the incentives for work, thus enhancing economic growth and relieving the financial 
burden of the system. 
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The Social Insurance System (SIS) in Greece is characterized by a multitude 
of problems - financial, social and organizational - that in the past have made it 
unsustainable in fiscal terms and counterproductive in improving generational 
fairness. On the other hand, its bureaucratic complexity makes planning and 
implementation of reforms a difficult task, while the short period that is typically 
served by political personnel in the competent ministries makes piecemeal 
adjustments rather than major restructuring to be more likely. The aim of the 
paper is first to describe the unsustainable dynamics and, second, to suggest 
guiding lines of feasible reforms that can improve the fundamentals of the system 
in the medium run. 
 
The most alarming feature in a SIS is the lack of financial sustainability that is 
felt as the gap between aggregate pension expenditure paid to the current 
generation of pensioners and the amount of available resources widens beyond 
the capacity of public finances. Resources may be accumulated either in the form 
of insurance contributions during the working age of current pensioners or 
disbursed through the contributions of present time employees. If exclusively 
based on the former type, the system is said to be ‘fully-funded’ and a SIS I 
sustainable if the cost of pensions equals the present value working-time 
contributions to the social insurance funds, including the returns on investments. 
If the latter type finances pensions, the system is called ‘Pay-As-You-Go’ 
(PAYG) that prevails in most European and OECD countries. Its political and 
social attraction is that each generation of pensioners is likely to benefit more 
than the case of the financing being based solely on their own contributions. As 
famously derived by Samuelson (1954), the reason is that current generation 
contributions versus latter generation’s ones are augmented by the rate of growth 
in per capita incomes plus the rate of increase of working population,  
However, the premises of the social contract implied by a PAYG system are 
shattered if ageing dynamics are such that the share of current labour force in total 
population is shrinking and/or the economy enters a prolonged slump and 
unemployment rises. In such cases, contributions may not be sufficient to finance 
unfunded and generous pensions agreed under more optimistic assumptions in the 
past. The emerging dilemma between cutting pensions of the older or raising 
contributions by the younger citizens leads to generational conflicts that 
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undermines social cohesion. Similar incentives for conflict are generated if the 
aggregate deficit in pension expenditure is financed by issuing public debt as this 
implies that taxes are likely to rise and borne by the current generation to repay 
the state’s obligations to the elderly. Given the pessimistic population forecasts 
in Europe, it’s no wonder that pension reforms are the thorniest issue of the public 
policy agenda in the European Union. In fact, as argued by Campanella (2016), 
the growing imbalances in the SIS finances pose a serious threat to the future of 
most members of the European Union. The situation is even more aggravated in 
Greece, as on top of population ageing the country suffers from a long recession 
and unemployment that has driven the ratio of employees to pensioners to 
historically low levels. Hence, a series of reforms to respond to the adverse 
developments is inevitable at a national level, and with a sense of urgency. 
The Greek pension system is described as an open Pay-As-You-Go system with 
defined benefits, in the sense that pension entitlements are predetermined by a 
number of parameters that depend on the political circumstances prevailing upon 
each person’s retirement, only loosely linked to the individual contributions paid 
during working time. This makes financing to be hostage to the health of public 
purse and, consequently, the lack of sustainability of the Greek SIS to be a major 
factor of economic uncertainty. The system has acquired deep intra-generational 
inequalities caused by the discrimination in the years required for retirement 
eligibility and on the rules of pension cofinancing by the State Budget, which vary 
substantially among employees and different sectors of the economy. As various 
Governments sought to raise finances through taxation and increased current 
contributions, the system started acquiring inter-generational inequalities as well. 
 
A factor that has concealed the inequalities from public attention and, thus, 
multiplied the current adversities was the fragmentation of the Greek SIS into 
many separate pension funds, each one having different rules, entitlements and 
financial opportunities depending on preferences of, and access to, the political 
system. The reason is that fragmentation facilitates the organization of privileged 
groups, which dominate public debates and influence political decisions to their 
own favor. In the past, the lobbies of the privileged groups have succeeded into 
thwarting major reforms and transferring the burden of adjustment to the 
taxpayer, thus perpetuating distortions and inequalities.  
Entitlements of retirement age and minimum working period are frequently 
manipulated by Governments as a means to confer favors to various groups of 
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political clientele, and are easily introduced by simple parliamentary approval 
without due consideration on the long-term sustainability. Similarly, the 
replacement ratio, i.e. the proportion of pension to working-time earnings, 
adjusted upwards in favor of certain groups, without any appeal to fairness among 
employees and retirees. Some sporadic reforms have been enacted in the past, 
though none of them radical enough to harness the tide of rising deficits or 
eliminate inequality.  Tinios (2016) gives an extensive and informative account 
of reform attempts and failures during the postwar period, while a Symeonidis 
(2015) gives a concise description of the reforms enforced during 2010-2014.   
Before the debt-crisis, Greece was having a high replacement ratio of around 
100% across all earnings levels and allowed for generous early retirement 
schemes, as noted by OECD (2013, p. 42).  
 
As aggregate pension expenditure was a key factor behind the collapse of the 
economy in 2010, the momentum of reforms on pensions vastly accelerated after 
the Greek debt-crisis. Most of austerity cuts and the organizational changes in the 
SIS was set as a pre-condition by the three bail-out Memorandum Agreements in 
2010, 2011 and 2015. Cuts applied at a progressive scale on the level of pensions 
in order to reduce income inequality among pensioners; for a brief description see 
Matsaganis and Leventi (2016, Table P1). They included dropping the two extra 
annual installments (the so-called 13th and 14th pensions), imposing a solidarity 
tax and straightforward reductions of main pensions. All these measures led to 
fierce opposition by affected groups, and Governments, in a desperate hope to 
minimize their personal political cost, were reluctant to engage in a full and 
immediate implementation. This attitude perpetuated the problems, increased 
distortions and made a new series of changes unavoidable.   
Although post-crisis reforms have reduced the replacement ratio below 80% and 
raised the retirement age from 58 to 65 years for the new pensioners, the 
accumulated inequalities continue to characterize the Greek SIS. For example, 
Symeonidis (2015) reports that although most pensions were cut after 2010, the 
income median of people above 60 years old fell less than the median of those 
below, thus the proportion of relative poverty was reduced. But since the number 
of actual working years was not taken into account in adjusting pensions 
downwards, unfairness against those with longer working-age and higher 
contributions continued. A further impediment is the chronicle lack of online 
digitalization of the system. This has made the task of accurately recording the 
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financial details next to impossible, and prevented a thorough evaluation of costs 
incurred by the complicated rules and entitlements accrued to every specific 
category of pensioners. 
 
A more ambitious reform was implemented in May 2016 (Law 4387), aiming at 
the unification of the Greek SIS and the centralization of pension calculation and 
allocation. A breakthrough is the restructuring of pensions into two components: 
on the one hand, the so-called ‘national pension’ not anymore related to 
contributions and wholly financed by the state budget; on the other the ‘main 
pension’ calculated on a wage average close to the date of retirement and taking 
into account the duration of contributions. Retirees with more than one pension 
claim will receive the national component only once, while others with paid 
contributions in excess of required thresholds are going to be awarded with 
slightly more generous replacement ratios. Kontiadis (2016) notes that merging 
the main SIS funds, combined with the unification of calculation rules and the 
establishment of a single collection mechanism for contributions, is in the right 
direction. However, the lack of managerial preparation has so far resulted in little 
progress in the field of institutional unification of the system.  
Although the new system closes the income gap between pension holders, its 
overall impact on efficiency and fairness is very much in doubt. As it appears, the 
new system will tend to favor low-income single-pensioner versus higher-income 
earners or multiple claimants; for an analysis of distortions see Zambelis (2016). 
The second reason is that several categories of recent retirees managed to protect 
their own entitlements from the new rules, thanks to the establishment of a 
‘personal transfer’ that compensates for the reduction envisaged by the new law. 
The normalization of recent and current entitlements is the subject of an 
agreement between the Greek Government and the European institutions, but not 
applied yet. Under the new framework, The younger workforce is, therefore, 
liable to higher contributions in order to finance the current SIS deficits and, 
nevertheless, will enjoy inferior retirement entitlements. This discrimination 
makes the Greek SIS to be actuarially unfair and creates counter-incentives for 
the younger generation to contribute to its financing. 
Two phenomena make the legacy of incomplete and inefficient reform in Greece 
to look even more threatening today: the first is a systematic population ageing 
that made the expansion of pension entitlements in the past to be a lot more 
burdensome for public finances. The second is the deep recession followed the 
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front-loaded implementation of the bailout programs since 2010. A series of 
economic and social adversities quickly appeared, exacerbating the problems of 
the Greek SIS accumulated thus far. To name but a few, activity collapsed by 
more than a quarter of pre-crisis levels causing a fall in incomes and the collection 
of insurance contributions. Furthermore, investment returns on social insurance 
funds shrunk after the collapse of sovereign bonds market and the partial debt 
default that took place in 2012. As a result, the SIS has entered a face of existential 
and multi-faceted crisis, the main aspects of which are described in subsequent 
sections. 
Building on previous work by Christodoulakis (2011, 2016), the present article 
argues that reforming the SIS in Greece should look beyond just another round of 
fiscal correction measures, and suggests a set of rules and ideas capable to stop 
the process of disincentives and inequalities entrenched in the current system. The 
existing system should converge to the benchmark model through a combination 
of political initiatives, fiscal constraints and private incentives.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes some 
fundamental characteristics of the Greek SIS, including the fiscal burden and the 
adverse consequences of current recession and unemployment. Section 3 shows 
how adverse population dynamics are likely to further augment inter-generational 
inequalities, while Section 4 discusses the political and organizational problems 
that have hindered reform efforts in the past. Section 5 sketches the main idea of 
a new benchmark and suggests a road map how this can be implemented so as to 
overcome the reaction from vested interests. Section 6 summarizes the main 
conclusions.  
 
2. Unsustainable finances 
A key pathology of the system is demonstrated in Fig.1 that shows the average 
pension received by age group and the respective cohort of pensioners to total 
retirees. Despite the changes and fiscal cuts that took place in the recent past, it is 
evident that 27% of retirees to date continue to receive a pension before the age 
of 65. Even more disturbing is the fact that early retirees are entitled with the 
highest pensions: the average pension for those up to 65-year old amounts to 
Euros 964 per month and is 20% above the amount of Euros 800 received in 




[Fig. 1, around here] 
 
The fiscal burden of a SIS is usually measured as the ratio of current public 
expenditure on pensions (PEP) to the country’s GDP. Fig. 2 plots this ratio for 
Greece versus the average of 27 other member-states of today’s European Union 
(EU). The European average is characterized by a steady – though mild – decline 
from mid 1990s until 2007.  In the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the 
accompanying recession, the ratio peaked and then stabilized to a new level at 
around 12% of GDP.  
Developments in Greece took a different course: despite solid GDP growth 
through the second half of the 1990s, the ratio was steadily on the rise due to an 
expansion of both pension entitlements and the number of retirees. A major 
initiative on reforming social security in 2001 was finally cancelled by massive 
opposition jointly organized by trade unions and pensioners. A less ambitious 
attempt to rationalize the Greek SIS by tightening retirement criteria and 
imposing restrictions on pension allowances finally implemented in 2002 and the 
burden subsequently stabilized at a level slightly above 11% of GDP.  
[Fig. 2, here] 
 
Soon, the burden started to rise again and continued unabated after 2005, though 
for different reasons before and after 2010. During the period 2005-2009, the 
number of pensioners as a share of total taxpayers increased from 27% to 28.5%, 
while their income rose from 24% to 27% of total income, clearly suggesting a 
systematic generosity in setting pensions.2 The rate of growth in pensioners’ 
income share slowed down only in 2010 after the first round of pension cuts was 
implemented by the bail-out requirements. Nevertheless, if PEP is expressed in 
GDP terms it seems to move even further away from the EU path due to the fact 
that the collapse of economic activity in Greece was far more pronounced than in 
other countries. Had Greece experienced a milder downturn in the aftermath of 
the global crisis, the public expenditure on pensions would have stayed around 
                                                          





13% of GDP, considerably lower than the present level, though still in excess of 
the EU27 mean. 
[Fig. 3, here] 
To demonstrate the effect of recession in exacerbating its trend, PEP is juxtaposed 
with the rate of unemployment. Fig. 3 displays a strong and positive correlation 
that is triggered by the combination of recession and over-taxation through the 
following channels: 
(a)  Higher unemployment is associated with lower activity, thus directly 
reducing the denominator of PEP to GDP ratio. 
(b)  A rise in unemployment reduces contributions, thus SIS deficits widen, 
raising the requirements of public financing.  
(c) Insurance contributions went further down due to increased moonlight 
activity in order to enhance take-home wages by avoiding taxation. 
Employers were just as keen to hire unregistered labour in their attempt to 
conceal taxable income and evade their own SIS contributions.  
(d) The repatriation of economic immigrants to their country of origin and a 
massive emigration of young Greek professionals abroad in search of jobs. 
Even if employment opportunities emerge again in the future, the usual 
hysteresis in rejoining the labour market is bound to exert a serious 
reduction in future contributions to the Greek SIS for many years. 
(e) In view of raising the retirement age, several thousands of employees chose 
early retirement schemes to avoid staying at work for longer than envisaged 
by previous entitlements. This reduced insurance contributions and drove 
public expenditure to even higher levels. Fig. 4 shows that during the crisis 
period 2009-2013, new retirements almost doubled in the public sector and 
among professionals in comparison to the pre-crisis rates. In contrast, new 
retirements among private sector employees remained below the rate they 
had in 2004, since they lacked similar entitlements. 
[Fig. 4, here] 
 
3. Unsupportive demographics 
Another source of mounting pressure on the Greek SIS comes from the systematic 




3.1.Population ageing  
Fig. 5 shows developments in Greece as compared to other European countries. 
In 2000, the share of people over-65 constituted 16.6% of total and seemed to 
approach a steady state of around 19% in 2009. In the aftermath of the crisis, the 
share surged by another percentage unit due to the emigration of younger cohorts 
abroad. 
[Fig. 5, here] 
 
The change in population deciles before and after the crisis is shown in Fig. 6. In 
2011, all age cohorts up to 79 year old appear to decline relative to 2007. The fall 
is more pronounced for the ages between 20-39 year old, where most of those 
seeking employment abroad are likely to come from. It is noticeable that the only 
cohort with an increase between 2007 and 2011 is the over-80s, so that pressures 
on the welfare and medicare systems are expected to rise. 
[Fig. 6, here] 
 
3.2. The decline in working-age population  
Because of systematic ageing, the proportion of working-age population in 
Greece has constantly declined since the beginning of the 21st century before 
further accelerating due to the emigration abroad. For comparison, Fig. 7 shows 
that the European average also deteriorated after the global crisis, albeit 
moderately, while working-age population in neighboring Turkey was rising fast. 
[Fig. 7, here] 
 
3.3. Generational inequalities 
The above developments imply that the financial requirements posed by current 
and soon-to-be pensioners are on the rise, while the reservoir of active labour 
force and the concomitant contributions are shrinking. Though it constitutes a 
time-bomb of inter-generational conflict, it is very difficult to be disarmed 
because change is blocked by the vested interests built upon intra-generational 
inequalities. On the eve of a reform that envisages a rise in retirement age, a 
reduction of the pension to salary ratio or even a modest restriction to preferential 
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entitlements, the affected groups react decisively and often successfully in 
annulling the reform.  
This is a typical case of status-quo winning against the interests of those outside 
the system of privileges, even when the latter are a majority but lack coordination. 
The status-quo alliance includes the groups of privileged pensioners and 
employees in the banking sector, public utility companies and the upper-class of 
professionals (mainly engineers, lawyers and doctors). It is supported too by the 
political personnel and other smaller groups, which enjoy pension rights that are 
disproportionately high relative to their contributions.  
Inter-generational inequality got even worse, when a firm distinction between 
those insured before and after 1993 was established. The latter had since to pay 
higher contributions and need to complete a longer working period before retiring.  
Unless major downward adjustments are put in place, the present generation of 
employees will be charged with even higher contributions to support current 
pensions at levels that are inconceivable to be enjoyed by themselves when they 
reach retirement age. A rise in social insurance contributions or in the income tax 
rate of those currently employed has an adverse effect on employment through 
the so-called ‘tax wedge’ effect.3 In a study for the OECD economies, Bassanini 
and Duval (2007) used data over the period 1982-2003 and established that a 10% 
rise in the tax wedge causes an increase in unemployment rate between 2.2% and 
2.8% of the labour force. In turn, this will further deteriorate PEP as implied by 
Fig. 3. 
. 
4.The Impediments to Reform 
Another factor that impedes a thorough reform plan in social insurance is that the 
political system is usually unprepared to face a prolonged protest by privileged 
groups and the impetus for change soon evaporates. Short-termism is deeply 
rooted in Greek politics through all the postwar period, no matter what the type 
of Government being in office. The fear of adverse political repercussions that a 
long reaching restructuring of the pension system could have had on the then 
ruling party forestalled several reform initiatives in the past. Tinios (2016) 
describes how major pension reforms were put aside by Conservative 
                                                          
3 The tax wedge is defined as the sum social insurance contributions and income tax as percent of 
nominal wages and its rise cuts take-home wages and pushes for higher nominal wages, finally 
increasing labour costs and reducing employment. 
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governments in 1958, 1978 and 2008 or by Centre-Left governments in 1965, 
1998 and 2001. Even in the absence of parliamentary democracy, the military 
junta was shaken enough by protestations and cancelled a pension bill in 1968.  
In practice, indecisiveness is encouraged by the occurrence of frequent elections 
and the pre-election tactics that prevail. Going to the polls, ministers tend to be 
reluctant in long term planning and implementation of reforms since they may 
not be in office to reap any positive outcome. The extremely short tenure for 
Social Insurance ministers is depicted in Fig. 8, showing that since 1974 duration 
was in average no more than fifteen months: Seventeen out of a total of 34 
ministers served for less than a year, while more than a quarter of them served for 
less than six months.  
 
[Fig. 8, here] 
 
Nevertheless, there might have been additional counter-incentives, due to the 
unequal distribution of pensions across the country. The average pension paid in 
rural areas is considerably below the national average due, obviously, to the larger 
proportion of farmers receiving the small ‘agricultural pension’. The highest 
average pension income occurs in the wider area of Athens, where the majority of 
retirees from banking sector, public utilities and public administration are living. 
Yet, fourteen out of seventeen Labour ministers4 served between1995-2015 were 
selected among MPs from the populous districts of wider Athens, thus making the 
effort of achieving a more equitable distribution of pensions to look self-
defeating. The reason is that a rationalization of the pension system should 
obviously include a curtailment of the most privileged constituencies, thus a 
minister elected in Athens would be paying a high price in terms of personal 
political prospects. Given the clientilistic character of electoral ties in Greece and 
the vast networking of pensioners’ unions, is no wonder that the period in office 
was so abruptly terminated and the reform effort abandoned.  
Finally, the lack of political incentives to implement a pension reform is 
intertwined with the difficulty of a precise description of the system, both fiscally 
and structurally. A detailed accounting of the Greek SIS is next to impossible, 
                                                          
4 Until 1994, the portfolio of Social Insurance was part of the Ministry of Health and then transferred to 
the Ministry of Labour. The move was seen as an attempt to make SIS provisions more compatible with 
labour market characteristics. 
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due to the sheer multitude of social insurance organizations, the complexity of 
the entitlement provisions, and the lack of a full-scale digitalization of the 
payment system. Even in the absence of political short-termism, the design of 
reforms would have been undermined by the system indeterminism as important 
information on actual financial flows may not be available or predictable on a 
detailed and well-documented basis.  
All the above factors explain why past reform efforts of the Greek SIS mostly 
constituted piecemeal corrections, which – at best – offered some short-term relief 
without terminating the main factors of p fiscal deficits and increasing 
inequalities.  
 
5. A New Benchmark 
Given the inequalities and lack of sustainability discussed in the previous 
Sections, reforming the social security system in Greece is reasonably expected 
to have an extensive effect on both the economy and society in terms of efficiency, 
equity and equality before the law. Feldstein (2005) suggests that for a social 
reform to be politically feasible it should be based on program transparency and 
enhance individual choice, thus a careful choice of policy indicators and transition 
rules are required first as explained below.  
 
5.1. A closed PAYG system 
Taking into account the strong reactions  that led to repeated failures in the past, 
Greece should find a realistic way to reform the SIS, without having to retort to 
the extremes of a a “fully-funded” system. Such a type of reform precludes social 
redistribution and is exclusively based on the future market return of individual 
contributions. The attempt to introduce such a model in Greece will give rise to 
such a vehement resistance by insiders that all efforts to establish it will be 
frustrated.  
A realistic compromise between the uncertainty of the open “Pay-As-You-Go” 
system and the straightjackets of the “fully-funded” system would be a closed 
PAYG system, similar to that applied in Italy or Sweden; for a comprehensive 
review see Holzmann and Palmer (2006). Such a system functions by adopting 
explicitly defined parameters concerning the co-financing of personal 
contributions through state participation. 
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The main issues in a SIS concern the proportion of pension finance that is covered 
by own-contributions and whether the rules apply equitably among the various 
categories of pensioners and between generations. A simple way to portray these 
relationships is to compare the present value of an individual pension at the point 
of retirement with the present value of own-contributions during work-life. If the 
two sides match, the system is “fully-funded”; otherwise additional finance should 
come from current generation employees in the form of contributions and/or 
taxes. In general, we have: 
 𝐹𝑃𝑉{𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠}𝐵𝑃𝑉{𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠} = 1 + 𝑘    (1) 
 
In the above expression, function FPV{.} denotes the forward present value 
calculation of pensions expected to be handed over the retirement years, while 
BPV{.} is the backward present value calculation of SIS contributions that have 
been paid during the past working years.  
Parameter (k) denotes the extent to which the value of pensions surpasses own-
contributions. A “fully-funded” system corresponds to k=0, while  k>0 implies 
that pensions should be supported by a PAYG system or by the State Budget. A 
system is intra-generationally fair if parameter (k) is the same across various 
sectors of current employees. To be inter-generationally fair it must retain the 
same non-negative value along current and future pensioners. 
The economic assessment of pension systems formally takes place by employing 
actuarial calculations for each pension fund, so that all parameters are properly 
taken into account. However, quite often such an analysis gets so complex that a 
policy debate is difficult to be organized as alternative options are not technically 
perceptible by the wider public. This makes the public reaction to pension reforms 
to be manipulated by outside political impressions and leads many citizens to 
resist changes even if they might be eventually beneficial for them. More often 
than not, the actuarial complexity is exploited by the most organized vested 
interests in order to oppose reforms in the first place and, thus, perpetuate their 
own privileges.  
For the consequences of a reform to be properly communicated to the interested 
parties, two conditions should be ensured: one is a system of personal actuarial 
accounting so that each citizen can assess the impact of reforms on his/her own 
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pension profile. The other is that the policy debate should focus around only a few 
and well-understood indicators that are crucial for the operation and sustainability 
of the entire SIS. Below is a brief description of these reform requirements. 
 
5.2 Individual Actuarial Accounts  
The impact of the reform should be assessed on a personal level so that each 
citizen can easily choose between alternatives. This can be done through the 
introduction of a pension and insurance contributions account for each person 
insured. The form is similar to a bank account and systematically records the 
insurance contributions paid by the worker, as well as those paid by the state and 
the employer.  
 
The account is capitalized in regular intervals and the employees are informed 
about the insurance credit accumulated in every period. Given a degree (k) of 
pension co-financing, the individual actuarial calculation gives them the option to 
select from a combination of retirement age and pensions that are compatible with 
their accumulated savings, as implied by (1). In case employees are hired by an 
entity using different co-financing parameters (k), the pension capital and returns 
adjust accordingly. Besides, this helps labour mobility among various sectors 
without any loss of insurance contributions, since all pension returns from each 
insurance period are added up and no contribution is waisted. 
 
5.3. Parsimonious policy indicators 
The key policy choice regards the co-financing parameter (k). The proportion of 
co-financing should take into account the peculiarities of each trade 
specialization, but otherwise the replacement ratio and the time-profile of work-
life and retirement apply universally to all. A description of the architecture of 
such a system with universal rules has been initially described in detail by 
Christodoulakis (2011). A similar proposal was more recently prepared by an 
expert committee set up by the Government in 2015, as reported by Nektarios 
(2016). A synthesis of the two approaches can be found in Christodoulakis, 
Nektarios and Theocharis (2018). 
A representative indicator of actuarial fairness should explicitly take into account 
both the actual duration of contribution payments, as well as the expected period 
of receiving a pension. The Period-Enhanced Replacement Ratio (PERR) is 
defined as follows: 
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 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑅 = [𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛][𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒] ∙ [𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠][𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠]   (2) 
 
The first fractional term in the right-hand-side is the usual replacement ratio, while 
the second gives the proportion between pension time and work time. In the 
Appendix, it is shown that, under some simplifying assumptions, the above 
fractional terms are the main determinants of expression (1). Hence, reforming 
the rules regarding the two ratios is an effective approximation of simultaneously 
improving fairness and sustainability in the Greek SIS.  
To make index PERR more egalitarian, policy measures should aim to adjust not 
only the traditional replacement ratio but also the duration of pension entitlements 
relative to that of contribution payments in the following sequence: First, a unified 
national benchmark for PERR will support a fiscally sustainable social insurance 
system. Then, the target can be reached through various policy combinations of 
the two ratios as in (2). Alternative options are possible concerning particular 
pension funds as a whole or each pensioner individually. For example, categories 
with a high period ratio should be awarded with a lower replacement ratio, or else 
face an increase in contributions or a rise in retirement age.  
The optimal combination should be carefully examined before a universal 
implementation is enforced. For example, it is frequently argued that, no matter 
how distortive an early retirement is in actuarial terms, it nevertheless releases 
work posts and thus contributes to new employment opportunities. In practice, 
however, there is no convincing evidence of such effects: Barr and Diamond 
(2008) notice that evidence from several countries shows that no pattern exists of 
lowering unemployment by applying early retirement schemes. The effect is 
probably even more distortive in Greece, where part of early retirees are engaged 
in informal employment afterwards, cutting opportunities from other candidates 
and avoiding contributions. On the other hand, cutting pension entitlements for 
early retirees is likely to exert a downward pressure on aggregate demand and 
depress new employment. On balance, raising the time threshold is more likely to 
help activity and new job creation rather than impede them and, thus, should be 
preferred to pension cuts. 
5.4. Implementation and transition rules 
The operational unification of existing funds envisaged in Law 4367/2016 
should proceed along a carefully drafted road map towards unified rules, without 
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any loss in present-value equivalent entitlements. In this case, the term 
“entitlement” denotes the accrued part of preferential arrangements. The portion 
of the entitlement that is preserved is easily calculated as the ratio of the years of 
employment up to that point to the total time remaining for the preferential 
arrangement to take full effect. 
Suppose, for example, a person who expects to receive a full pension after 25 
years of work and has already worked for 15 years. When moved to the unified 
fund with the provision of working for 35 years, this person will hold a fraction 
of 15/25 or 60% of the pension entitled to thus far. This amount is supplemented 
by 20/35 of the new pension, in accordance with the subsequently uniform rules, 
if this person completes 35 years of work. If, however, the person wishes to retire 
after just 25 years of work, as initially entitled to, then the additional amount will 
be equal to 10/35 or just 28% of the new pension. In this case, the total pension 




Two major conclusions emerge from the above analysis: First that short-term 
corrections are unlikely to face the deep structural deficiencies of the system and 
a major overhaul is deemed necessary. Although public expenditure for pensions 
was reduced in 2011 and again in 2012 and 2016 in absolute terms, this is not 
enough to make the system sustainable in the long run. In fact, the policy is to 
some extent self-defeating, in the sense that pension cuts (and especially on the 
lower ones) led to a serious decline in aggregate demand and caused a fall in 
output, thus further exacerbating the public finance ratio.  
Second, that population dynamics are bound to make the fiscal burden even worse 
in the near future. With the present generation of employees burdened by higher 
contributions to support pensioners, the incentives to stay and work in Greece are 
diminishing as witnessed by the current surge of outward emigration, thus further 
shrinking the basis for financing the rising population of pensioners.  
A key reform is restructure the Greek SIS as a universal system, based on the 
premises of the recent Pension Reform Act of Law 4367/2016. The political and 
financial advantages from the creation of a universal insurance fund are evident 
and extensive, including: 
a) uninterrupted labour mobility; 
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b) full transparency and disclosure of egregious pension inequalities; 
c) easy calculation of the fiscal cost corresponding to each category; 
d) freedom to choose retirement age; 
e) equity, partial for today’s citizens and full for the future generations. 
But, no matter how well-intentioned it may be, reforming the Greek SIS is not 
likely to be successful if implemented without paying due attention to the overall 
macroeconomic environment. The fiscal burden of SIS moved in line with 
unemployment, while the incentives for increasing participation in the labour 
force are more likely to operate if activity is on the rise and new investment is 
attracted. All these requirements point to the direction of avoiding any further 
burdening of contributions from current and future generation of employees and 
employers; in fact, relieving the existing costs is essential for setting off 
investment activity. A full-scale proposal is described in the study by 
Christodoulakis, Nektarios and Theocharis (2018). 
The essence of the new changes is that the burden falls unequally on between and 
within generations. For it must be borne mainly by the current population of 
pensioners or those close to retirement, not by the younger generations of 
employees as the convenient option has been in the past. Within the elder 
generation, the burden must be allocated mainly to the groups of pensioners 
mostly privileged in retirement entitlements in the past. At the same time, the 
welfare system provides protection from poverty and social marginalization of the 
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Deriving the period-enhanced replacement ratio 
 
Calculations are presented in continuous-time for analytical simplicity. Discrete-
time expressions are available by the author. The following definitions are 
adopted: P denotes the pension, W the nominal wage, q the rate of social insurance 
contributions, rW and rR the rates of return during working life and retirement 
respectively, TW and TR the age of entering work and retirement respectively, and 
L the life expectancy.  
 
Function FPV{.} denotes the forward present value calculation of pensions that 
are expected to be received for the next (L-TR ) retirement years, while BPV{.} the 
backward present value calculation of SIS contributions that have been paid 
during the past (TR –TW ) working years. 
 
Retirement is assumed to take place at period t=0 and the retiree expects that at 
time t>0 he/she is going to receive a pension equal to {𝑃0,𝑡𝑒 } for the next  (𝐿 − 𝑇𝑅) 
periods. With a rate of return on capital equal to (rR ) the cost of pensions in 
present value terms is given by: 
 𝐹𝑃𝑉{𝑃, 𝑟𝑅 , (𝐿 − 𝑇𝑅)} = ∫ exp [−𝐿−𝑇𝑅0 𝑟𝑅𝑡] ∙ 𝑃0,𝑡𝑒 ∙ 𝑑𝑡   (3a) 
 
The retiree has entered employment at the age (𝑇𝑊) and in period (s) of working 
life he/she received a wage (WS )  and paid social insurance contributions at a rate 
(qS ).  With a rate of return on insurance savings equal to (rW ) the present value 
of accumulated contributions is given by: 
 𝐵𝑃𝑉{𝑞𝑊, 𝑟𝑤, (𝑇𝑅 − 𝑇𝑊)} = ∫ exp [+0−(𝑇𝑅−𝑇𝑊) 𝑟𝑊𝑠] ∙ 𝑞𝑠𝑊𝑠𝑑𝑠  (4a) 
 
To obtain more easily handled expressions a number of simplifying assumptions 
are made as follows: 
 
A1.Pensions, wages and contributions rate are kept constant over time. 
A2.Working period was uninterrupted by unemployment. 




Under the above assumptions (3a) and (4a) can be explicitly calculated as: 
 𝐹𝑃𝑉{𝑃, 𝑟𝑅 , (𝐿 − 𝑇𝑅)} = 1𝑟 ∙ [1 − exp (−𝑟(𝐿 − 𝑇𝑅))] ∙ 𝑃   (3b) 
 
 𝐵𝑃𝑉{𝑞𝑊, 𝑟𝑤, (𝑇𝑅 − 𝑇𝑊)} = 1𝑟 ∙ [exp(+𝑟(𝑇𝑅−𝑇𝑊)) − 1] ∙ 𝑞 ∙ 𝑊 (4b) 
 
For relatively small values of 𝑟(𝐿 − 𝑇𝑅) and 𝑟(𝑇𝑅−𝑇𝑊) the Taylor 
approximation for the numerators in the right-hand-side of expressions (3b, 4b) 
gives: 
 1 − exp[−𝑟(𝐿 − 𝑇𝑅)] ≈ 𝑟(𝐿 − 𝑇𝑅)   (5a) exp[+𝑟(𝑇𝑅−𝑇𝑊)] − 1 ≈ 𝑟(𝑇𝑅−𝑇𝑊)   (6a) 
 
Recalling definitions (3a) and (4a), using approximations (5a, 6a) and dividing 
(3b) and (4b) by parts, actuarial expression (1) becomes: 
 𝐹𝑃𝑉{𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠}𝐵𝑃𝑉{𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠} = 𝑃𝑞𝑊 ∙ (𝐿−𝑇𝑅)(𝑇𝑅−𝑇𝑊)        (7) 
 
The period-enhanced replacement ratio is given by 
 1 + 𝑘 ≈ 𝑃𝑞𝑊 ∙ (𝐿−𝑇𝑅)(𝑇𝑅−𝑇𝑊) = 1𝑞 ∙ 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑅    (8) 
 
The above approximation is the basis on which the policy analysis in Section 4 is 
conducted. For more significant values 𝑟(𝐿 − 𝑇𝑅) and 𝑟(𝑇𝑅−𝑇𝑊) the Taylor 
approximation should include higher-order terms, but nevertheless the 








Fig. 1. Pensions by age group, monthly average July 2015. 
Notes: The Lhs shows average monthly pensions in Euros as per July 2015, and the Rhs the age 
cohort in % of total pensioners. A cohort below 25 years is omitted as this includes only pension 
heirs, not pensioners. Source: HDIKA, Monthly Record of Pension Payments and Social 
Transfers. Report No. 26, July. Table 4, p. 6, July 2015. Unified System of Pension Auditing 

































Fig. 2 Public expenditure on pensions as percent of GDP 
Notes: The low and high contours represent the minimum and maximum levels prevailing 
each period in EU27. Source: Pension data from OECD Factbook 2014, PORDATA. 




































































































Fig. 3. Public expenditure on pensions as percent of GDP and 
unemployment rate in Greece 2005-2012. 
Source: Pension data from OECD Factbook 2014, PORDATA. Unemployment 
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Fig. 4. New retirements 2004-2013 by sector 
Notes: IKA includes private sector employees; OAEE professionals and SMEs. 


























Fig. 5.  Population share of age 65 and over in Greece and the EU 
The European reference includes 19 EU countries plus Iceland and Norway, 
excluding Greece. The mean obtained as simple average. The low and high 
contours are two standard deviations below and above the mean.  



















































































Fig. 6. Population in Greece by age groups. 
Source: Census 2011. Table 2A. ELSTAT publication. 


















Fig. 7. Working-age population 2000-2012 










































































Fig. 8. Social Insurance ministers’ tenure in office 1975-2015.  
Note: Until 1994, Social Insurance was part of the Ministry of Health, then 
removed to the Ministry of Labour. Duration in months. Author’s calculations. 
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